The American Stand on Qatar

By Mohammad Aburumman

تم نشره في Wed 14 June / Jun 2017. 12:00 AM
  • Mohammad Aburumman

There are multiple catalysts in the Gulf crisis today.

It has various dimensions and many repercussions, which is why power halls around the world are convinced that it will resolve itself, somehow.

Some see there being a possibility that the parties involved may find common grounds to resolve it, or it may end as it typically does, the Arab Way; make up and make nice.

Essentially, the crisis is rooted in the fundamental differences in foreign police between Qatar and other states in the region, especially in the Post-Arab Spring period.

Mainly, there is dispute among these countries on supporting political Islamism and change, as the Saudi-Emirati position stands absolutely against it.

The latter camp seeks to establish an Arab-Gulf coalition which prioritises the vilification of Iran above all else.

This has radically polarised the regional alignments in regards to the Egyptian, Yemeni, and Syrian situations, as well as to the regional position from Turkey.

All of them stand against Bashar Assad in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, but they disagreed on the role of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, the most important factor in the discourse of the Gulf Crisis and its impending scenarios is the US position, which is still unclear.

Clearly, the discombobulation of US statements, between the President’s address, the secretary of defence, and the foreign secretary, on the Qatar standoff makes it even more ambiguous.

Is the White House confused?!

Obviously, the US administration has no clear cut stand on the situation. To what extent will the Americans back Qatar? Is there a plan to change the regime or just the overall policy and approach of the country?

In general, Trump’s exceptional persona transcends standard procedure.

The US President may actually make statements which contradict with the official US approach by American institutions and his own staff.

It has become natural to see Trump say one thing, then have the White House retract it a few hours later.

This is what happened when his secretaries tried to contain Trump’s statements by making contradicting statements.

As for the possible turnouts of the Qatari situation, there is a third option which has not been visited above.

Some within the Qatari and global power halls look beyond Trump’s subjective outlook on the Gulf Crisis.

Those view Qatar as an ally, housing a US military base. Approaching a US ally in this matter is both unfeasible and possibly catastrophic.

This lot is building a gradual anti-Trump current within the American house, towards legally ousting him.

According to them, the more Qatar is pressured, the more it seeks to tighten its relations with regional powers who do not exactly favour the US regional influence.

The deep institutions of the US, which see Qatar as an ally, sees Trump’s behaviours as desperate attempts to prove himself on the foreign frontier.

Proponents of this hypothesis see that the US never needed to stir any regional turmoil in order to force the Gulf state into changing its regional or internal approach.

Those see internal US confliction as one of the Crisis’s main catalysts, and is therefore a decisive factor in its resolve.

This article is an edited translation of the Arabic version, published by AlGhad.

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