A drought in the political environment?

تم نشره في Mon 24 February / Feb 2014. 12:14 PM - آخر تعديل في Mon 24 February / Feb 2014. 10:24 PM

By Muhammad Aburumman

It is understood that the Lower House asks for announcing a state of "drought" because of the low precipitation level, which sounds a warning for our limited water stock, agriculture, and morale of our people who see the drought in the rainless freezing wind.

What is frustrating the people further is the state of drought felt beyond the weather, reaching a culture, economy, and a political life that seems rather empty.

The irony is that this drought has touched the political opposition, who were supposed to be transformed into an efficient and active "cell", to assess the current situation and invest in the current situation, regionally and economically, the impacts of the Syrian crisis on Jordan, and the consequences of what is happening in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon on the entire region.

On the contrary, we find the opposition in its weakest moments - in an apparent laziness - as if deeply fractured; even a vital and ideologically pertinent, for the opposition parties, topic like US foreign secretary John Kerry's plan could not unify them again, leaving each of them to reject it, miserably and independently, on its own.

During the last couple of months, the opposition suffered a mighty blow that led to a decrease, in an already limited, youth popular movement. They turned against themselves because of what is happening in Syria (Stance against Bashar Al Assad's regime) and what is happening in Egypt (Stance against the military coup and what followed) - summoning ideological and historical differences between the Islamists on one hand, and the leftist-nationalists on the other.

These differences hit the committee coordinating between the opposition political parties and the national reform front led by Ahmad Obeidat. Attempts to bury the hatchet and re-build the bridges failed; the nationalists demanded the Islamists representation in the reform front to be done through the Islamic action front, and not the Muslim Brotherhood, and that was rejected by the Brotherhood itself. And there it is still stuck.

Even the already limited youth popular movement is not tenacious enough, but is suffering internal divisions due to politics and personal interests. What is unifying them, however, is that they all failed to put forth a unified, strong rhetoric on the nature, stages, and steps to achieve the reform they are seeking.

Does this serve the state, strengthen political stability, confirms the "righteousness" of "official policies", and lead the decision makers to feel content? Or is it the opposite; an indicator of a negative sociopolitical atmosphere, divided social structure, and an impotence of the political interplay to renew the rules of political legitimacy?

Is the weakness of the political opposition, in spite of which, and the lack of political leaders on the other end of the equation in favor of the "system", or is it not?

Do they find comfort in this "political environment of drought" on the internal front and accept what has been achieved in regards to the reform project and democracy, or is it exactly the opposite; do they find it a statement of frustration and desperation to achieve peaceful transformation?

I believe the opposition, state, and political powers need to ask themselves these questions, and answer all the possible scenarios. Maybe it could mean something.



This article is an edited translation from the Arabic edition.