Where does Hamas stand in relation to the Islamists disagreements?

تم نشره في Tue 3 June / Jun 2014. 11:30 AM - آخر تعديل في Tue 3 June / Jun 2014. 11:31 AM

By Fahed Khitan

The Hamas leadership is following closely on the current crisis of the Islamic movement in Jordan. What's worrying them is regional side of the disagreement between both sides; the reformist movement Zamzam, and the group's leadership.

Leading figures in Hamas realize that the crisis is different this time; it is not just a disagreement with some people in the movement who can be “let go” without cost to the organization, as was the case in the earlier stages, but it is a deep, rooted conflict between the two currents, each with its own base and regulations, and if not treated wisely, the movement is marching towards a historical split.

Forecasts vary on the role of Hamas as to what is happening among the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan; while prominent leaders at the movement deny any role for Hamas in the crisis, leading figures at the Muslim Brotherhood say Hamas is throwing its full weight behind the group's leadership, and provide them with logistical support.

Hamas, and with a tone of defiance, responds to these accusations, and stresses that it stands at the same distance between the parties of the dispute, and also sends warning signals for the risk of polarization and division within the movement.

It seems clear from the rhetoric of the leaders of Hamas its resentment of the decisions of the leaders of Zamzam — considering their stance a behavior that belongs to a mentality that does not believe in pluralism, as they called them.

It should be noted here that the relationship with Hamas is not a key issue of the Islamists’ recent crisis. For years, Hamas was strongly present in the corridors of the Islamist movement and the struggles of its currents.

The issue is different this time; the debate is focused on the role of movement in public life, and the need to repair the frameworks of its leadership and its intellectual and political rhetoric, to keep abreast of new developments and challenges after the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" in Egypt and other Arab countries, and to draw lessons from the experiences of Islamist success and failure  in the "Arab Spring".

The Islamists big mistake in Jordan is that they linked their rhetoric and political movement with failed experiences, instead of following the success stories elsewhere; like the Islamist experiment in Tunisia, and they fell into the trap of exclusion — they even choose their stance voluntarily, and took the same approach to manage their internal differences.

Their behavior made their opponents battle against them easy; as soon as they started defending failed positions, they became partners in the failure; a diverse public opinion will not put its faith in their ability to take on a leadership role in the reform process.

The difference between the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its Palestinian sister Hamas is that the latter revised its predicament after the decline of the project of political Islam in Egypt and the region, and embarked on a policy of diversifying its options internally to walk in the path of reconciliation with Fateh, while regionally started lines of communication with Iran and Hezbollah.

In contrast, Islamists in Jordan froze in time at the “coup” moment, and used the same term to discredit the opponents of the movement's leadership.

Hamas, and even if they repeatedly declare they are not linked to the Islamists disagreements in Jordan, they remain the only party capable of influencing the course of events, at least by reminding their "loved ones" in the movement that the “coup” train has left.



This article is an edited translation of the Arabic edition.